

Brazil's international educational cooperation in African countries: a case of 'graduation dilemma'?

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North–South foreign aid and South–South development cooperation differ in terms of historical trajectories, political motivations and agenda, symbolic regime, involvement of domestic actors, and institutional designs conceived by national governments in order to implement their strategies.¹ Even within OECD countries, which have gone further in defining common criteria and peer-review monitoring mechanisms, governmental practices vary significantly.² This diversity of national backgrounds and the lack of an institutionalized development cooperation regime create difficulties (for example, in making statistical comparisons across the globe, and in attempting collective building of norms involving both developed and developing countries), but also create opportunities for political creativity and innovative management practices in the field of South–South cooperation (SSC).

In the case of Brazil, engagement in SSC is not new; its first experiences date back to the 1960s. However, Brazil's governmental funding and interest in this agenda have grown since the adoption of the 1988 constitution, particularly during the mandates of the two Workers' Party (PT) presidents. Historically, this article focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014, beginning with Lula da Silva's inauguration in his first presidential mandate and ending in the last year of Dilma Rousseff's first mandate.³ Empirically, the article attempts to answer the following questions: what is Brazil's contribution in the field of international development cooperation (IDC), particularly in respect of educational cooperation (IDC/ED)? And what are the norms and criteria driving Brazil's decisions in this field?

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¹ Deborah Bräutigam, 'Aid "with Chinese characteristics": Chinese foreign aid and development finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime', *Journal of International Development* 23: 5, 2011, pp. 752–64; Sean Burges, 'Brazil's international development co-operation: old and new motivations', *Development Policy Review* 32: 3, 2014, pp. 355–74; Sachin Chatuverdi, T. Fues and E. Sidiropoulos, eds, *Development cooperation and emerging powers: new partners or old patterns?* (London and New York: Zed, 2012); Ngairé Woods, 'Whose AID? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance', *International Affairs* 84: 6, Nov. 2008, pp. 1205–11. For the concept of 'symbolic regime', see: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations: rethinking key concepts in IR* (London: Routledge, 2012).

² Carol Lancaster, *Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Linda Chisholm and Gita Steiner-Khamsi, eds, *South–South cooperation in education and development* (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 2009); Maurits van der Veen, *Ideas, interests and foreign aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³ President Rousseff's second mandate was characterized by a deep political and economic crisis, which resulted in her removal from power in August 2016.

Theoretically, the main argument advanced is that Brazil's official engagement in IDC can be considered as an expression of a 'graduation dilemma', the main concept around which this special themed section of the journal is organized.

In this article, Brazil's IDC refers to a broad range of practices including educational, scientific, financial, humanitarian and technical cooperation. Technical cooperation and educational cooperation are thus conceptually subsidiary to international development cooperation. Brazil's 'graduation' refers to a historical process of change in international hierarchy, in terms of scale, social status and recognition. It implies not only an ambition to move upward in the hierarchy, but also a political drive to revise rules in the field of IDC. As Milani, Pinheiro and Lima recall in this special themed section of the journal,⁴ the concept of graduation dilemma has four main elements, three of which are addressed in this article. The first element relates to the uncertainty confronting leaders of countries that are in a second-tier position in the international hierarchy (in the present case, Brazil), arising for the most part from contestation either by established powers that are members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), or by peers such as Mexico, South Africa or Turkey, which have also undertaken significant SSC projects in recent times. The dilemma here refers to the fact that Brazilian leaders may need to step up the international game and be more innovative in their own development cooperation approaches. The second element relates to the need for a second-tier power to use international institutions to promote changes in the field of IDC, which raises the question: through which multilateral organizations can a country such as Brazil promote change in IDC norms and rules? Are there institutional veto-players? Can Brazil build strong peer coalitions? The third element concerns the domestic social and political costs of Brazilian decision-makers' choices in the field of SSC: how can they publicly justify international cooperation with other developing countries in Africa or Latin America when many domestic social policies, particularly in the education sector, still require so much investment nationally? Bearing in mind this engagement with the concept of 'graduation dilemma', this article is divided into three main sections: first, an overview of Brazil's IDC; second, a discussion of Brazilian IDC in the field of education; and third, a review of Brazil's educational cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African (PALOP) countries.

Brazilian IDC under PT governments: policy sectors, domestic actors and priority regions

Irrespective of their contrasting perspectives, IR specialists agree on the fact that Brazil's foreign policy has gone through a series of changes under the PT governments of da Silva and Rousseff.⁵ Notwithstanding the clear differences

⁴ Carlos R. S. Milani, Leticia Pinheiro and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, 'Brazil's foreign policy and the "graduation dilemma"', *International Affairs* 93: 3, May 2017, pp. 585–605 above.

⁵ Andrés Malamud, 'A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy', *Latin American Politics and Society* 53: 3, 2011, pp. 2–24; Maria Regina Soares de Lima, 'Relações Interamericanas: a nova agenda sul-americana do Brasil', *Lua Nova*, no. 90, 2013, pp.

between them in terms of rhetorical skills, public diplomacy, and political and geographical priorities, both presidents emphasized autonomy, national development, regional integration, South–South relations, multilateralism and a multipolar world vision in their foreign policy strategies. Both also advocated a deeper reform of global governance structures to give more voice to emerging powers in decision-making. This political ambition, which did not have the support of all domestic political and economic agents, gave rise to the country's international prominence in building new coalitions (such as the G20 in the WTO negotiations, the India–Brazil–South Africa forum or the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), promoting interregional dialogues (between South America and Arab or African countries), leading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and proposing mediation (together with Turkey) over the Iranian nuclear programme.⁶

This new diplomatic profile also resulted in a considerable change in Brazil's IDC engagements, with governmental global expenses in this field increasing from US\$158 million in 2005 to approximately US\$923 million in 2010. Over the same period, technical cooperation expenditure grew fivefold, from US\$11.4 million to US\$57.7 million, and spending on humanitarian cooperation has risen from US\$488,000 to US\$162 million. Table 1 compares official public expenditure in various areas of IDC for the years 2009 and 2010. In 2010, 68.1 per cent of all Brazilian IDC went to Latin America, 22.6 per cent to Africa, 4.4 per cent to Asia and the Middle East, 4 per cent to Europe and 1.1 per cent to North America. In Latin America, the top five partner countries accounted for 80.4 per cent of all Brazilian IDC to the region: these were Haiti (47.4 per cent), Chile (16.3 per cent), Argentina (8.6 per cent), Peru (4.5 per cent) and Paraguay (3.6 per cent). In Africa, PALOP countries accounted for 76.5 per cent of all Brazilian IDC to the region: Cape Verde headed the list with 24.4 per cent, followed by Guinea-Bissau with 21.2 per cent, Mozambique with 13.3 per cent, Sao Tome and Principe with 10.4 per cent and Angola with 7.2 per cent.⁷

According to its most recent official report, using data from 2011 to 2013, Brazil's total IDC expenditure amounted to almost US\$1.5 billion, 56 per cent of which took the form of contributions to international organizations. Official data show that in the nine years from 2005 to 2013, Brazil's federal government spent approximately US\$4.1 billion on IDC. In 2011, 2012 and 2013, Brazil's technical cooperation

167–201; Sean W. Burges, 'Consensual hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War', *International Relations* 22: 1, 2008, pp. 65–84; Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, *Brazilian foreign policy in changing times* (Plymouth, Devon: Lexington, 2009).

⁶ Celso Amorim, *Acting globally: memoirs of Brazil's assertive foreign policy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

⁷ Brazilian statistics for IDC are known as COBRADI (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional/Brazilian Cooperation for International Development) and its main source of data is the Applied Economics Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas, IPEA), an important government think-tank within the Ministry of Planning. See IPEA and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), *Brazilian cooperation for international development 2005–2009* (Brasília, 2010). Two subsequent reports were published in 2013 (covering data from 2010) and 2016 (covering the years 2011–13): IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2010* (Brasília, 2013); IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013* (Brasília, 2016).

Table 1: Brazilian IDC in 2009 and 2010

<i>Area of IDC</i>	2009		2010		<i>Change 2009–10</i>
	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>% of total</i>	
Technical cooperation	55.54	11.5	57.77	6.3	4.0
Educational cooperation	25.27	5.2	35.54	3.8	40.7
Scientific and technological cooperation	n/a	n/a	24.10	2.6	n/a
Humanitarian cooperation	49.46	10.2	162.06	17.6	227.7
Peacekeeping operations	71.26	14.8	332.42	36.0	366.5
Contributions to international organizations	281.34	58.3	311.57	33.7	10.7
<i>Grand total</i>	482.86	100.0	923.38	100.0	91.2

Source: Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas (IPEA) and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2010* (Brasília, 2013), p. 18.

Table 2: Brazilian IDC in 2011, 2012 and 2013

<i>Area of IDC</i>	2011	2012	2013	2011–13	
	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Total (US\$ million)</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Technical cooperation	45.62	33.97	31.85	111.43	7
Educational cooperation	20.69	22.25	23.81	66.75	5
Scientific and technological cooperation	73.11	72.09	53.17	198.37	13
Humanitarian cooperation	72.42	109.83	21.67	203.91	13
Refugee protection and support	4.71	4.12	1.81	10.65	1
Peacekeeping operations	40.17	20.65	10.33	71.15	5
Contributions to international organizations	331.64	250.86	254.16	836.66	56
<i>Grand total</i>	588.35	513.77	396.81	1,498.93	100

Source: IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013* (2016), pp. 15–16.

was mainly directed to countries in Africa (46.4 per cent of all expenditures with technical cooperation) and Latin America (45.5 per cent). In Africa during this period Brazil cooperated most frequently with Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea-Bissau. Between 2011 and 2013 there have been dramatic increases in expenditure directed to other countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, within the framework of a large capacity-building programme in the fields of cotton and agricultural development.⁸

These figures show that Brazil has accelerated its engagement in South–South cooperation activities, even if the size of Brazilian IDC is not large by OECD DAC standards. It is true that these figures also illustrate an exceptionally high 2010 budget: the country's growth rate was around 7.5 per cent in that year, and several domestic ministries increased their participation in technical cooperation activities as a means of promoting their own policy initiatives. That was the case of the ministry of education, through the National Educational Development Fund (FNDE), and also the ministries of social development (MDS) and rural development (MDA). Fostering technical cooperation projects, very often in partnership with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC), which is part of the foreign ministry, and multilateral organizations (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, and the World Food Programme), was a way to gain legitimacy for some social policies that were not consensual in the domestic realm, or at least not among key members of the political elite. The international dissemination of the food purchase programme, family agriculture support, school meals projects, aside from the well-known Bolsa Família programme—particularly with the support of UN agencies and the World Bank—was part of a strategy to make them more acceptable nationally.

The figures also demonstrate the disparity in scale between Brazil's IDC and that of other developing countries. For instance, in 2011 Brazil spent approximately US\$588 million, whereas South Africa spent US\$229 million, Mexico US\$99 million, Chile US\$24 million, Colombia US\$22 million and Indonesia US\$19 million.⁹ Material differentiation from its peers is the first evidence of Brazil's ambition to move towards graduation in the field of IDC, even if Brazil's government does not consider itself a 'rising donor'.¹⁰

Some comments are in order about the Brazilian accounting system for IDC, known as COBRADI. First, Brazilian IDC is statistically defined as funds that are 100 per cent concessional, i.e. without any obligation to repay. This can be interpreted as the Brazilian government demonstrating a political will to go

⁸ IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013*, p. 26.

⁹ In quantitative terms, Brazil's 2011 IDC expenditure is lower than that of China (US\$2.78 billion), Turkey (US\$1.3 billion) or India (US\$794 million). However, data for the first two of these countries are described as mere estimates of 'ODA-like' flows in OECD DAC reports. In line with comments on Brazil's datasets on IDC throughout the article, caution is also needed about the comparability of such figures for China, Turkey or India with those for DAC members. This shortcoming highlights the similar difficulties one faces in analysing the role of other second-tier powers in this area. Please see OECD, *Development co-operation report 2013: ending poverty* (Paris: OECD, 2013); OECD, *Development co-operation report 2016: the sustainable development goals as business opportunities* (Paris: OECD, 2016).

¹⁰ ABC, *Relatório de Atividades, Janeiro de 2015 a Maio de 2016* (Brasília: ABC, 2016).

far beyond the OECD DAC's own definition of official development assistance (ODA), which requires a minimum of 25 per cent of concessional funds. One could also see this statistical definition as representing a political effort to revise the symbolic and conceptual dimensions of what has been set up by the DAC. Just as in global governance debates, where the Brazilian government has defended a thorough institutional reform of political and economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the UN Security Council, so Brazilian diplomacy could also be playing a revisionist role in respect of aid norms and cooperation institutions. Indeed, Brazil has joined China, India and South Africa in challenging the OECD's institutional role in the aid system.¹¹ As part of this diverse group of countries, Brazil under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff tried to use its foreign policy to break the political and normative monopoly of OECD-DAC member countries. Second, because the COBRADI statistics do not take into account public funds that are not 100 per cent concessional in nature, they exclude loans given by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), foreign debt write-offs, or activities implemented by subnational entities within the Brazilian federation. As a result, COBRADI might underestimate the real Brazilian contribution in the field of IDC.

In terms of implementation, Brazil's IDC strategy gives priority to the exchange of experiences (policy practices), and emphasizes the use of government officials, civil servants and public institutions as a primary instrument of the country's contribution to international development. Delivering technical cooperation through civil servants from ministries and public agencies is one of the main characteristics of Brazil's IDC. This has to date contributed to hindering the growth of an 'aid industry' in Brazil. However, as a result, many civil society organizations end up being excluded from IDC projects and programmes. There are exceptions, such as Viva Rio, Associação Alfabetização Solidária (Solidarity Literacy, ALFASOL) and Missão Criança, which are examples of NGOs currently involved in the ABC's educational and humanitarian cooperation projects in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. Nevertheless, several Brazilian rights-based NGOs criticize the Brazilian government for what they label as a 'participation deficit', a subject that still needs more attention from academic social science research and advocacy policy networks.

Brazilian IDC activities do not involve direct financial transfers to partner countries. As a result, it is very difficult to make comparisons between what the Brazilian government has been doing and what the OECD's DAC donors have done, since the basic statistical definitions are not the same. In spite of this, and taking into account all the statistical singularities of Brazil's IDC system, table 3 makes an attempt to contrast Brazil with other selected donors in terms of consolidated IDC expenditure in developing countries in general, and in PALOP countries in particular, for 2010.¹² What does the table reveal? Key points are

¹¹ Emma Mawdsley, *From recipients to donors: emerging powers and the changing development landscape* (London: Zed, 2012).

¹² The selection of donor countries was based on the following factors: (1) France and the UK have GDPs of similar magnitude to Brazil's; (2) for historical reasons Portugal is obviously a key country in all PALOP

that in 2010 Brazil spent more than France in three of the five PALOP countries (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe); that Brazil's total IDC contribution is somewhere in between those of Portugal and South Korea, still extremely low when compared to countries with similar GDPs, such as France or the United Kingdom; and that in Angola and Mozambique the financial impact of Brazilian IDC is very limited when compared to almost all the other selected countries. Taking these observations alongside Brazil's ambition and the role it expects to play in South-South relations, it is apparent that under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff the country entered the world of IDC but in its own way, and with its own twist.

Table 3: International cooperation in PALOPs, all sectors (US\$ million, current prices, 2010)

<i>Selected countries</i>	<i>ODA to all developing countries</i>	<i>ODA to Angola</i>	<i>ODA to Cape Verde</i>	<i>ODA to Guinea-Bissau</i>	<i>ODA to Mozambique</i>	<i>ODA to Sao Tome and Principe</i>
France	9,148.32	6.23	4.06	1.84	20.76	2.38
Portugal	431.83	15.11	146.56	15.72	116.00	25.72
South Korea	900.61	18.83	0	0.012	0.10	0
Spain	4,389.81	13.38	21.23	8.29	60.93	1.27
United Kingdom	8,016.80	16.68	0.9	0.07	104.42	0
United States	26,586.41	54.82	37.12	6.52	277.91	0.02
Brazil ^a	597.01	2.64	8.95	7.80	4.90	3.81

^a The total figure for Brazil's IDC in 2010 was US\$923,375,671, which includes bilateral and multilateral funds. We have withdrawn amounts spent with developed countries, and contributions to multilateral organizations. We took the data for 2010, when Brazil had an exceptionally high budget, and chose that year as a basis for comparison with other countries. We only have disaggregated data on Brazil's IDC for the 2010 budget. *Sources:* OECD DAC online database for ODA statistics (www.oecd.org/dac); IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2010*, pp. 18–24).

countries, which are taken as a case-study in this article; (3) the US is a major international donor, with decentralized USAID offices all over Africa, including in Luanda and Maputo; (4) Spain and South Korea have similar GDPs, and both have been very active in recent debates in the OECD about aid effectiveness; (5) South Korea is an emerging donor (like Brazil), and also a newcomer to DAC membership.

Institutionally, the ABC was at this time the main national implementing agency for technical cooperation projects (taking 71.6 per cent of the total budget), followed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA, 5.5 per cent) and the ministry of health's international cooperation branch (4.5 per cent). Technical cooperation is not a priority in terms of public expenditure: it accounted for 6.3 per cent of Brazil's total 2010 IDC budget, and an average of 7 per cent over 2011–13 (see tables 1 and 2). Even so, it is celebrated worldwide thanks to its adaptability to local contexts in other developing countries, and also to the fact that it mobilizes public policy expertise that is valued as international good practice. Agriculture, health and education were the three main sectors of Brazil's IDC between 2003 and 2014.¹³ Apart from ABC, there are also special international cooperation units within 'domestic' ministries (health, education, culture and rural development, among others). Other IDC initiatives have also come from the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, participatory national councils (for instance, the very active Council on Food Security, CONSEA, as well as the Permanent Committee for International Affairs, CPAI, linked to the National Council of Rural Sustainable Development, CONDRAF), federated states and municipalities. Institutional coordination of all these activities is still a challenge to Brazilian authorities in general, and to the ABC in particular.

Geographically speaking, Brazilian technical cooperation is concentrated in two main regions: Latin America and Africa. This fact stems from the historical formation of Brazil's own society, its culture and, more recently, some identity changes in foreign policy: in the aftermath of redemocratization, and particularly since 2003, Brazilian foreign policy agendas have focused increasingly on South–South relations. Scope for developing IDC projects with Latin American and African countries is facilitated by an existing network of diplomatic representation worldwide, which guarantees direct bilateral dialogue with many developing countries. Within the African continent, for instance, Brazil has 37 embassies, whereas France has 50, the United States 55, Mexico 8, Turkey 35, China 41 and India 29, according to data available on the websites of their respective ministries of foreign affairs.

Paradoxically, Brazilian IDC may also reveal public–private tensions that can be identified in the traditional practices of DAC members, since countries where technical cooperation projects are more numerous may also be those where Brazilian transnational companies and businesses are present. Brazilian foreign direct investment (FDI) in mining (by Vale), infrastructure and civil engineering projects such as roads, airports, harbours, metros, energy systems, etc. (by Oderbrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Correa, among others), oil prospection (by Petrobras) and agribusiness, among other economic sectors, have been key development actors in African and Latin American countries. New sectors such as biofuels (ethanol

¹³ Lidia Cabral and Julia Weinstock, 'Brazil: an emerging aid player. Lessons on emerging donors, and South–South and trilateral cooperation', briefing paper no. 64 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010); Carlos Puente, *A cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira como instrumento de política externa: a evolução da cooperação técnica entre países em desenvolvimento—CTPD—no período 1995–2005* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010).

and biodiesel) have emerged in more recent years, exacerbating these tensions and introducing some contradictions into Brazil's SSC discourse and practice.¹⁴ FDI is of course different from IDC, but on the ground the divisions between practices and agents involved in one and the other are often blurred, just as they are in North–South cooperation. Brazilian businesses' strategies in Africa and Latin America may raise political and ethical questions about how different Brazil's pro-corporate economic growth is from other economic models promoted by western countries and rising powers. If Brazilian SSC strategies are to be a development alternative, empirical research needs to establish how distinctive they really are from traditional foreign aid practices.¹⁵

Brazilian IDC in the field of education: the main norms and features

Brazilian government officials avoid terminology, criteria and norms stemming from the OECD DAC. Words such as aid, donor/recipient relationship and political conditionality are absent from both the official diplomatic discourse and the ABC's reports. A critical approach towards traditional aid, along with the country's own material and policy capabilities which enable it to promote its development without much dependence on North–South cooperation, have fostered the emergence of a global development cooperation strategy based on horizontality, non-conditionality and the demand-driven principle. These concepts are reflected in official documents produced by the ABC and IPEA. Horizontality implies a lack of hierarchical relationships between Brazil and its partner countries in terms of decision-making and project implementation; non-conditionality means that the Brazilian government should respect other sovereign developing nations, and should not impose any political conditionality related to democracy or human rights on its IDC programmes; the demand-driven approach is rooted in the idea that it is up to the partner developing countries to formulate and organize their demands with a view to cooperating with Brazil, without any interference from Brasília. Of course, these principles and narratives—including also the emphasis on co-responsibility, cultural and social commonalities, partnership and sharing of expertise, non-intervention in domestic affairs and state-to-state cooperation—are rooted in an official foreign policy rhetoric that must be interrogated through analytical and empirical work by independent researchers in the field.

Particularly between 2003 and 2014, Brazil's development cooperation policy was invested in the construction of a symbolic regime based on a commitment to South–South solidarity. Brazil is not a member of the OECD, and favours debates and proposals on IDC under the umbrella of the UN Economic and Social Council's Development Cooperation Forum, which is acknowledged by Brazilian

¹⁴ Sayaka Funada, *Análise do discurso e dos antecedentes do Programa Pró-Savana em Moçambique—ênfoque no papel do Japão* (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2013); Ana Saggiore Garcia, Karina Kato and Camila Fontes, *A história contada pela caça ou pelo caçador? Perspectivas sobre o Brasil em Angola e Moçambique* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Políticas Alternativas para o Cone Sul/PACS, MISEREOR, 2013).

¹⁵ Jing Gu, Alex Shankland and Anuradha Chenoy, eds, *The BRICS in international development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

diplomats as a legitimate and universal multilateral institution for exchange and negotiation in this issue area. Economic and political crisis in 2014–15 and the controversial 2016 impeachment of President Rousseff may have had some effect on this positioning, and Brazil's behaviour in this field will need to be monitored in the future. However, irrespective of these crises, it is interesting to observe that at different occasions between December 2015 and November 2016 the ABC presented a framework for the quantitative and qualitative assessment of South–South development cooperation that was in line with what previous PT governments had supported in terms of foreign policy and development cooperation. There could be an effect of bureaucratic inertia, or it may be simply that the agenda is considered of less strategic significance by the new government.

According to the ABC's online database, education is one of the three highest-priority sectors within Brazil's technical cooperation programmes, together with health and agriculture. Most of the technical cooperation activities developed in the education sector (TC/ED) are related to training, capacity-building, public management and technology transfer in the fields of vocational education, adult and youth literacy projects, non-formal education and special needs education. In terms of expenditure on both completed and continuing activities reported by the ABC between 2005 and 2013, education is ranked third after agriculture (19.26 per cent) and health (15.4 per cent), at 10.93 per cent, ahead of defence and military cooperation (9.14 per cent), environment (6.01 per cent), social development (4.47 per cent) and energy (4.02 per cent). Geographically, the ABC's cooperation in education is focused on Latin American, Caribbean and African developing nations, as well as East Timor.

In addition to supporting education through technical cooperation, as reflected in the data published by the ABC, Brazil's government also gives scholarships for foreigners to study at national universities. Indeed, scholarships constitute the main thrust of Brazil's development cooperation in education. According to the latest report, Brazil's federal government spent approximately US\$55 million on educational cooperation projects between 2011 and 2013.¹⁶ The provision of scholarships to enable foreign students to come to study in Brazil is a historical policy, launched in 1950. According to the 'educational themes' division of the ministry of external relations, the main objectives of Brazilian educational cooperation are: (1) to promote higher educational standards among citizens from other developing regions; (2) to foster dialogue in the field of education between Brazilian and foreign youth; and (3) to disseminate Brazilian culture and language. In fact, culture and education are both considered important sources of Brazil's 'soft power' in the international realm. They may also contribute to strengthening political and economic ties between Brazil and its partner countries. Cultural and historical ties are frequently mentioned in foreign policy speeches as a kind of justification for selecting PALOP countries as priority destinations for technical and educational cooperation.¹⁷

¹⁶ IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013*, p. 67.

¹⁷ Leticia Pinheiro and G. Beshara, 'Política externa e educação: confluências e perspectivas no marco da inte-

Brazil tends to concentrate its cooperation in the field of higher education on key Latin American and African countries: around two-thirds of graduate scholarships (PEC-G) are generally taken by PALOP students, and a similar proportion of postgraduate scholarships (PEC-PG) go to South American students. Once again, then, the geographical distribution of funding reflects foreign policy priorities; however, within the general foreign policy guidelines the ministry of education also tends to give preference to exchange programmes with countries experiencing deficiencies in their higher education systems. Latin American countries have a relatively better institutional development in the field of higher education when compared to other developing countries, and Spanish-speaking Latin American universities are among the oldest in the Americas: examples are Santo Domingo (founded in 1538 in the Dominican Republic), Lima (1551 in Peru), Córdoba (1613 in Argentina) and La Habana (1721 in Cuba). Accordingly, their main priorities in terms of exchange with Brazil tend to be research networking and capacity-building for PhD candidates. Between 2011 and 2013, the main sending countries for PEC-PG scholarships were Colombia (352), Peru (154), Mozambique (140), Cape Verde (45), Argentina (45), Cuba (36), Ecuador (35), Bolivia (34), Chile (25), Angola (24), Paraguay (24), Uruguay (23), Mexico (22) and East Timor (18), accounting for 977 out of a total of 1,094 scholarship places.¹⁸

In the case of PEC-G students, the Milton Santos Project for Access to Higher Education (known as PROMISAES) has since 2003 provided per capita allowances of US\$300 per month (an amount equal to the standard minimum wage in Brazil) to support the maintenance of some African students. However, not all students have access to this financial support. Students are selected in their own countries, according to procedures designed by the national ministry of education and the local Brazilian embassy. In the period 2011–13, the main sending countries for graduate courses (PEC-G) were Guinea-Bissau (173 students), Cape Verde (169), Angola (158), Paraguay (63), Congo (61), Benin (51), Democratic Republic of the Congo (40), Ecuador (31), Mozambique (23), East Timor (23), Sao Tome and Principe (19), Jamaica (19) and Haiti (16), accounting for 846 out of a total of 992 students.¹⁹

Institutionally, the ministries of education, science and technology and of external relations (educational themes division) have been the main conceivers and executors of exchange and scholarship programmes. The ABC plays no role in this particular area of policy expertise, its activities being confined to evaluation, monitoring and implementation of technical cooperation in the field of education. This division of tasks within the external relations ministry indicates a first layer of agenda fragmentation, inhibiting both bureaucratic coordination and global reporting capacities.

gração regional', in Leticia Pinheiro and Carlos R. S. Milani, eds, *Política externa brasileira: as práticas da política e a política das práticas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2012), pp. 149–80; Danielle Ullrich and Rosinha Carrion, 'A cooperação brasileira na área da educação nos PALOPs no período 2000–2012: principais atores e projetos', in *Proceedings of the fourth meeting of the Brazilian International Relations Association* (Belo Horizonte, 2013).

¹⁸ IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013*, p. 81.

¹⁹ IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2011–2013*, pp. 77, 81.

As well as scholarship programmes, the Brazilian government funds other IDC/ED academic activities. In 2010, the ministry of education's CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior [Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel]) funded bilateral educational programmes to the tune of US\$5.3 million in countries including Argentina, Cape Verde, Cuba, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The ministry of education also promotes international cooperation in the field of vocational and professional training, aimed at foreign professional staff and civil servants, although in 2010 funding of this kind of professional training remained low at US\$1 million.²⁰ Data disaggregated by kind of training are not available for previous years. The government also engages in triangular cooperation with international organizations and NGOs: for instance, the 'Youth Leaders for the Multiplication of Good Socio-Educational Practices' project in Guinea-Bissau is implemented in cooperation with UNESCO and fully funded by the ABC. Nevertheless, all these are sporadic activities that are quantitatively unimportant; between 2003 and 2014 (as in previous years) academic graduate and postgraduate scholarship programmes were the main thrust of Brazil's development cooperation in the field of education. Why is Brazil's development cooperation in education particularly concentrated in higher studies? Is this also the case for PALOP countries? What hypotheses may be advanced to explain this concentration?

Brazil's educational cooperation with PALOP countries

As tables 4 and 5 show, African countries (in particular the five PALOP countries) are key partners for the ABC and the Brazilian ministry of education. Educational cooperation with these partners takes various forms: distance and vocational education appears as the main activity implemented by the ABC, but in budgetary terms educational exchange programmes rank above all other types of educational cooperation between the Brazilian government and the PALOPs.²¹ The Rio Branco Institute of the foreign ministry (the Brazilian diplomatic academy) also receives young diplomats from Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe for professional training, and some Brazilian civil society organizations may be called upon by the Brazilian government to implement non-formal education projects for young people or adults. Even so, in the case of the PALOP countries too, Brazilian educational cooperation is focused on PEC-G and PEC-PG programmes.

According to the available official data presented in tables 4 and 5 (overleaf), between 2000 and 2015, 5,500 students came to Brazil on graduate scholarships (PEC-G) from PALOP countries, representing 57.7 per cent of a total of 9,523

²⁰ IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2010*, p. 42.

²¹ Many of the ABC's activities have only minor financial implications, since they operate through public civil servants, SENAI (National Service for Industrial Learning), other public agencies and some civil society organizations. This does not mean that they are not policy-relevant. Investigating these activities in detail is a matter for future work, which would require qualitative research, case-studies and field trips in order to assess actual results and policy impact. These aspects cannot be assessed through the statistics currently made available by the ABC.

Table 4: Number of PALOP students under graduate scholarships (PEC-G), 2000–15

Countries	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Angola	3	21	29	23	31	11	31	28	91	68	48	83	61	53	59	77	719
Cape Verde	117	65	227	263	192	230	314	265	381	206	133	76	150	88	104	119	2,880
Guinea-Bissau ^a	36	88	111	97	58	186	159	19	133	181	95	55	118	0	0	0	1,336
Mozambique	12	13	27	21	26	27	13	9	4	4	9	7	6	13	13	9	213
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	24	0	47	147	35	13	12	4	6	19	5	3	19	17	358
5 PALOP	168	187	418	404	356	601	552	335	621	463	291	240	295	157	195	222	5,500
All Africa	187	214	451	442	395	650	589	378	784	517	383	378	378	255	339	357	6,697
Latin American countries	135	172	140	82	52	130	127	125	118	125	115	84	99	132	147	162	1,945
Asia ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	37	4	4	47
All countries ^c	322	386	591	524	447	780	717	503	902	642	498	463	477	427	880	967	9,523

^a Because of a *coup d'état* Guinea Bissau was suspended from the programme in 2013.

^b Asian countries (East Timor, Pakistan and Thailand) started sending students in 2006.

^c All countries = all Africa + Latin American countries + Asia.

Source: Divisão de Temas Educacionais, MRE (<http://www.dce.mre.gov.br>).

foreign students, and between 2000 and 2014, 489 postgraduate students (PEC-PG) out of a total number of 2,638 (18.5 per cent). This confirms that students from PALOP countries account for the greatest proportion of participants in the PEC-G scholarship programmes, and represent the third major group (after Latin America and all African countries put together) under the PEC-PG programmes.

Moreover, still under the rubric of cooperation in the field of higher education, two new federal universities were recently established in order to promote cooperation with Latin American and PALOP countries: UNILA (Federal University for the Latin American Integration) in 2008, and UNILAB (Federal University for the International Integration of the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony) in 2010. Alongside their more traditional academic activities, these two universities also bear responsibility for receiving students from Latin American and PALOP countries. This governmental decision reaffirmed the relevance of these regions in Brazil's international strategy. Today UNILAB has 4,726 students, of whom 3,398 are graduate students. Among these 3,398 graduate students 2,510 come from Brazil, 81 from Angola, 91 from Cape Verde, 540 from Guinea-Bissau, 26 from Mozambique, 81 from Sao Tome and Principe, and 69 from East Timor. Another 1,328 students are enrolled in distance education programmes (1,167) and in postgraduate courses (161).²² However, the current budget constraints imposed by the new government

²² UNILAB's website (www.unilab.edu.br) presents information about many cooperation missions and visits

Table 5: Number of PALOP students under postgraduate scholarships (PEC-PG), 2000–14

Countries	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Angola	1	1	6	3	1	2	3	7	5	2	8	10	8	2	8	67
Cape Verde	4	4	5	5	6	12	22	6	8	7	15	4	14	13	7	132
Guinea-Bissau	1	1	3	1	1	6	5	2	3	2	6	2	5	0	0	38
Mozambique	5	5	9	5	8	12	16	12	9	3	8	21	24	52	51	240
Sao Tome and Principe	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	0	12
5 PALOP	11	12	23	14	16	36	46	27	25	15	38	38	53	69	66	489
All Africa	14	15	25	17	17	40	48	32	28	16	39	39	59	72	77	538
Latin American countries	61	60	74	39	52	73	122	127	141	196	143	168	161	208	124	1,749
Asia ^a	1	1	0	0	1	7	1	11	14	18	6	8	6	2	5	81
All countries ^b	76	76	99	56	70	120	171	170	183	230	188	215	226	420	338	2,638

^a East Timor, China and India are the three main Asian countries.

^b All countries = all Africa + Latin American countries + Asia.

Source: Divisão de Temas Educacionais, MRE (<http://www.dce.mre.gov.br>).

threaten the continuity of programmes implemented by these two new federal universities, which were created under a PT government.

In global terms, a comparison between the amounts of Brazil's IDC/ED and selected DAC donors' ODA in the field of higher education may open up new avenues for the analysis of Brazil's potential impact in the PALOP countries. Table 6 presents data for the same selection of countries as in table 3, this time for ODA in the field of education (ODA-ED), alongside Brazil's IDC/ED to all developing countries and to PALOP countries in particular. The first point to note is that the degree of concentration on higher education programmes is very significant in the case of Brazil: higher education represents more than 99 per cent of all its IDC/ED with developing countries, whereas in the case of Portugal the proportion is 60 per cent; for South Korea around 27 per cent, the United States 19.5 per cent, the United Kingdom 10.7 per cent, Spain 10.2 per cent and France 6 per cent. Second, looking only at the PALOP countries, the United States and United Kingdom are strikingly almost entirely absent (Britain grants meaningful funding for Mozambican education, but not higher education). Third, the data suggest a possible element of competition between Portugal and Brazil: Portuguese ODA-ED is higher than Brazilian IDC/ED in all PALOP countries, apart from Guinea-Bissau. However, confirmation of this hypothesis, based on a

involving the nine members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.

Table 6: Educational cooperation with PALOP countries (US\$000, current prices, 2010)

	All developing countries		Angola		Cape Verde		Guinea-Bissau		Mozambique		Sao Tome and Principe	
	<i>Education^a</i>	<i>HE^b</i>	<i>Educ.</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>Educ.</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>Educ.</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>Educ.</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>Educ.</i>	<i>HE</i>
France	1,784,331	107,487	3,569	1,556	873	814	375	343	963	796	564	564
Portugal	72,780	43,695	5,444	2,042	19,149	19,006	4,844	1,859	10,358	2,501	6,035	3,763
South Korea	150,122	40,500	1,392	71	1	0	43	43	61	0	0	0
Spain	363,789	37,233	934	20	1,772	7	1,362	4	7,532	23	0	0
UK	751,119	80,809	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,074	0	0	0
US	889,120	173,391	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	35,382	35,230	1,924	1,866	6,869	6,663	5,570	5,403	1,905	1,847	822	797

^a Education = all education sectors.

^b HE: only higher education.

Sources: OECD DAC online database for ODA statistics (www.oecd.org/dac). Brazilian data on IDC/ED accessible through IPEA's COBRADI project, directed by Dr Joao Brigido.

soft power rivalry between a former metropolis and a rising state in their respective relationships with the five African countries, requires further statistical analysis, alongside in-depth qualitative analysis and field research.

There is a range of possible reasons why the Brazilian government, in particular between 2003 and 2014, decided to concentrate educational cooperation programmes in higher studies to this extent, notably in PALOP countries. First, it is a simple and effective modality of cooperation: the government just needs to create places and offer vacancies, most of which are in public universities not yet full to capacity with domestic students, so that bringing in international students contributes to reducing unused capacity in university infrastructure and staff. Second, related operational and transaction costs are very low. Exchange programmes mainly mobilize institutions at the federal level, where the country excels in terms of bureaucratic capacity and professional management of projects. Also, cooperating through universities does not necessarily imply giving grants to international students. Some obtain grants from their own governments, whereas others are civil servants in their home countries; there are also students who may benefit from grants that are given by DAC member countries within the framework of triangular cooperation schemes. Third, cooperating through universities projects a favourable image of Brazilian higher education institutions. Internationalization is a key variable in world university rankings such as the Times Higher Education, Shanghai's Academic Ranking of World Universities or the QS Top Universities. Therefore, receiving African students also contrib-

utes to a better performance by Brazilian universities in the global and regional higher education competition. Fourth, through higher education cooperation programmes Brazil can also disseminate its contribution in many scientific areas; theories, concepts and methods developed in Brazil may be spread in part through the foreign students who participate in the international circulation of ideas and research. Exchange programmes create a direct link between education, training and science. By means of capacity-building programmes addressed to the elites of its partner countries, Brazil's government is able to foster professional networks linking national citizens and international students who may become future managers, chiefs of departments, diplomats, heads of ministries, etc. in their home countries. Thus exchange programmes bolster solidarity between academic and political elites on both sides of the South Atlantic. Fifth, one of the dimensions of the graduation dilemma related to the social and political costs of the choices the government makes can be more easily tackled: whenever the government has to justify its expenditure on development cooperation in public audiences before parliamentarians and civil society activists, or to the press, these four sets of motives can be articulated along with a legitimation narrative based on the fact that the government does not divert resources from the field of fundamental education, where domestic needs are still acute.

Concluding remarks

In this article, we have provided information on Brazil's role in a relatively less well-known area of international cooperation: education. The emphasis on South–South cooperation, on specific areas selected for the provision of aid, and on new ways of framing Brazil's role in development cooperation under the most recent PT administrations should help the reader to understand how Brazil used this policy in pursuit of its ambition to rise to a more influential status in international affairs, thus illustrating the notion of 'graduation dilemma' explored in this special themed section of the journal. The various sets of data provided clearly add weight to the argument presented and corroborate the claim that, despite a series of institutional obstacles and other growing national shortcomings, Brazil's contribution in the field of education should not be disregarded in wider comparisons of current international assistance flows. The analysis presented here further highlights how strongly African Lusophone countries stand out as clear priorities for this kind of sectoral cooperation, particularly in terms of higher education. It also provides some interesting clues to what may be expected in the years ahead, in terms of Brazil's own institutions and their range of action and capabilities in this area.

In spite of the current economic crisis affecting both emerging and established markets, the political influence of rising powers such as the BRICS countries is rapidly increasing in international development, as shown by the creation of the BRICS' New Development Bank and China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but also by reforms to the IMF's quota system and governance that have

recently become effective, thus giving more power and greater say to these countries in global economic decision-making.²³ Through their foreign policy agendas as providers of technical, economic, humanitarian and educational cooperation, these countries are also seeking a greater role in international rule-making, which, alongside political ambition, is one of the two key markers of graduation, as it is considered in this issue of *International Affairs*. In the particular context of Brazil between 2003 and 2014, both factors were present. Brazil's role in IDC was also motivated by a search for a wider recognition of its own social policies and development trajectory as potentially useful to other developing countries. Policy transfer is therefore one of the means most frequently employed by Brazil in its IDC schemes.

By means of educational cooperation, the Brazilian government has sought to establish substantive international relations with Latin American and African (especially Portuguese-speaking) countries. There are at least three dimensions to this endeavour. First, education relates directly to the qualification of labour, and Brazilian cooperation seeks to build capabilities in partner countries where it also has strategic investments (the economic dimension). Second, educational cooperation is part of a positive foreign policy agenda, through which Brazil aims to promote closer relations between states and societies based on principles of solidarity and non-intervention in other developing countries (the symbolic-political dimension). Third, higher education training and language learning programmes contribute to the strengthening of cultural bonds between different societies and the promotion of increased mutual understanding of the realities of different countries, and also to the dissemination of Brazilian culture (the cultural dimension). In the case of PALOP countries, the cultural and historical dimensions are key aspects in understanding the evolution of educational cooperation programmes since the 1970s.

However, Brazilian IDC/ED with PALOP countries also shows important shortcomings. Brazil emphasizes horizontal cooperation and interstate cooperation, but—in contrast to traditional donors—it only exceptionally channels its cooperation through civil society organizations. Moreover, there are no formalized mechanisms of meaningful civil society consultation on IDC policy conception and implementation. Despite this participation deficit, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, when applied to international cooperation, provokes public debate in Brazil around human rights and democracy promotion. The case of the 2012 military coup in Guinea-Bissau provides a good example of the Brazilian government's contriving to bypass the debate: although it observed the rules of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), which had suspended Guinea-Bissau from all forms of intergovernmental cooperation, including federal government educational programmes, Brasília introduced an element of flexibility by allowing students from Guinea-Bissau to enrol for

²³ In fact, as a result of this IMF reform, Brazil, China, India and Russia will be among the top ten members of the IMF in terms of quota and voting share. See <http://thebricspost.com/imf-reforms-china-india-brazil-russia-get-greater-say> (accessed 20 March 2017).

exchanges at the UNILAB university in Ceará. The government's argument in this case was that it should suspend interstate cooperation projects, but should not punish national citizens for a military coup.

Difficulties may also arise out of inefficient implementation and promises that are not followed by concrete actions. The cooperation architecture requires a professional bureaucracy at the domestic level. Improvising is risky. This implies that the Brazilian government needs to confront its own issues related to the lack of state capacity, absence of a proper regulatory framework, insufficient funding, little evaluation of results, constant budget cuts and operational procedures. However, this article does not aim to propose a new model for the consolidation and institutionalization of Brazilian development cooperation. In the current political environment in which the ABC's reconfiguration is considered by the Brazilian government, there are questions that may be considered of paramount relevance for the future construction of Brazilian public policy on development cooperation, and for the consolidation of Brazil's profile in the field of educational cooperation. The ABC does not yet have the means (human resources, budget, regulatory framework, political power) to coordinate and evaluate all the activities currently being implemented. The Brazilian government needs to refine its understanding of cooperation and therefore its precise statistical definition, as one of the indispensable conditions for increased transparency, accountability, and social understanding of what is at stake. These are only some of the issues that the Brazilian government needs to address in order to consolidate its trajectory in the field of IDC in general and educational cooperation in particular. The celebration of the 30th anniversary of the ABC's foundation in 2017 offers a good opportunity for rethinking its future development.

No state cooperates without interest, and Brazil is no exception. Even in countries with low material capabilities and a low human development index, such as Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe, there may be different domestic economic and political interests at stake. Given the limited extent of Brazil's hard power assets, a substantial role in multilateral and regional organizations, and a strong record in offering educational cooperation programmes, constitute important policy instruments in Brazil's external relations. If the five graduation conditions (material capacity, political will, recognition by established powers and peers, domestic cohesion among strategic elite members, and societal support) are taken into account,²⁴ it is possible to conclude that between 2003 and 2014 Brazil had material capacities and a strong political will to promote its IDC programmes, including those in the field of education. These also stood to benefit from recognition by DAC members and peers in the developing world. In multilateral gatherings such as the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in 2011, Brazil's diplomacy was called upon to build bridges between traditional donors and non-DAC members. The Brazilian government even profited from this recognition in multilateral organizations, having received strong support mainly from African countries in the elections of directors in the World Trade Organization and the FAO.

²⁴ Milani, Pinheiro and Soares de Lima, 'Brazil's foreign policy and the "graduation dilemma".'

Nevertheless, between 2003 and 2014 Brazil's foreign policy focus on South–South solidarity lacked the support of key domestic agents (including the media), thus hindering cohesion among government and strategic elites. In the transition between Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, policy experts and civil society organizations expected that the government would implement institutional measures, such as reform of the ABC and the establishment of a legal framework and a professional career in the field of development cooperation. These measures were not taken during Dilma Rousseff's first mandate. Development cooperation and priority relations with African countries have not trickled down in Brazil's society at large; nor have they conquered the hearts and minds of domestic elites. Crucial economic and political difficulties of the beginning of Rousseff's second mandate turned into an institutional crisis in 2016. Nowadays, building domestic coalitions to support South–South cooperation is even more difficult. The two key categories of graduation seem to have faded away, leaving Brazil's development cooperation policy at a watershed.

