



OCCASIONAL PAPER NO 179

Global Powers and Africa Programme

March 2014

Brazil's South–South Co-operation Strategies: From Foreign Policy to Public Policy

Carlos Milani

South African Institute of International Affairs

African perspectives. Global insights.

ABOUT SAIIA

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record as South Africa's premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs, with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA's occasional papers present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace; and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about SAIIA's work.

ABOUT THE GLOBAL POWERS AND AFRICA PROGRAMME

The Global Powers and Africa (GPA) Programme, formerly Emerging Powers and Africa, focuses on the emerging global players China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa as well as the advanced industrial powers such as Japan, the EU and the US, and assesses their engagement with African countries. The programme aims to contribute towards outcomes and results that will leverage the growing engagement of the BRICS countries in Africa in support of policymaking that will deliver good, transparent governance and sustainable development on the continent, while also supporting a North-South dialogue on global governance reform challenges as they relate to Africa and its place in the world.

SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the Foundation Open Society Institute, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the Danish International Development Agency which generously support the GPA Programme.

Project leader and series editor: Dr Chris Alden, j.c.alden@lse.ac.uk

© SAIIA March 2014

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US\$ unless otherwise indicated.

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the role of institutional and non-institutional actors in current Brazilian foreign policy agendas, particularly in the field of South–South co-operation. The plurality of actors and agendas results in an increasingly complex decision-making process, bringing about the challenge for the Brazilian government to avoid traditional conceptions of foreign policy as a perennial state policy and start thinking of foreign policy as a public policy. This change in mind set and in institutional patterns requires that the state and the government, which are in action at the international level, should be seen as the main producers of this policy, but in dialogue with other actors.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Carlos Milani is professor of International Relations and Political Science at the State University of Rio de Janeiro's Institute for Social and Political Studies (IESP-UERJ). He is also a research fellow with the National Science and Technology Council in Brazil (CNPq), and is currently Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Political Science Association (ABCP).

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries
Embrapa	Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Company)
Fiocruz	Fundação Oswaldo Cruz
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IPEA	Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research)
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comum do Sul (Common Market of the South)
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PALOP	Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (Portuguese-Speaking African Countries)
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SSC	South–South co-operation
TCDC	technical co-operation among developing countries
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (South American Nations Union)
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development

INTRODUCTION

Brazil's current foreign policy operates within a framework that consists of a plurality of actors and agendas. In addition to many non-traditional state actors ('domestic ministries', federal agencies and subnational entities) that challenge the alleged monopoly of one of the most traditional Weberian bureaucracies in Brazil (the Ministry of External Relations, known as Itamaraty), foreign policy agendas concern numerous non-state actors, who defend public and collective interests (public health, human rights, education, culture, environment), but also the interests of economic sectors (such as business companies).¹ This plurality of actors and interests stems from the fact that both the international and the domestic orders, despite their structural inequalities and differences, leave open several spaces for political action.

This plurality of actors and agendas results in an increasingly complex decision-making process, putting on the political agenda the challenge for the Brazilian government to avoid traditional conceptions of foreign policy as a perennial state policy,² and to start thinking of foreign policy as a public policy.³ This change in mind set requires that the state and the government, which are in action at the international level, should be seen as the main producers of this policy. Of course, non-governmental actors should also have a relevant role in policy formulation or implementation, and should be able to exercise some influence on its content. However, ultimately, the government has the responsibility for all public policies, including foreign policy. This conception of foreign policy firstly allows for the differentiation of foreign policy from international action of non-state actors. Business companies, networks, social movements, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are key actors of international relations, but only states or particular political communities (such as the EU) have foreign policies. Secondly, this shift leads to consideration of the notion of 'state authorisation' or 'authoritativeness' in foreign policy: public agencies (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, or Embrapa; and Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, or Fiocruz) or subnational entities (federated states, cities) that seek to build co-operation agendas for development must obtain the authorisation of a primary actor (in the case of Brazil, the Presidency of the Republic) that guarantees the expression of state authority in the conduct of any foreign policy agenda. This seal of 'authoritativeness' can (and should) be democratic, rooted in a dialogue with Congress and civil society, but the ultimate decision in foreign policy comes constitutionally from the executive power.

As a consequence, in order to consider foreign policy as public policy, theoretically one needs to separate the concept of foreign policy from the cruder realist versions of 'national interest'. It is important to question the realist assumption that the state's behaviour can only be understood in reference to 'national interest'.⁴ True, it is a fact that the national interest emerged in state-formation history as a political idea that was in opposition to the notion of the 'Prince's interest', following the evolution of national feeling and gaining scope with the development of democratic state institutions.⁵ However, the ambiguity of the realist conception of national interest concerns the attempt to objectify the goals attributed to the nation, sometimes called the 'supreme interests of the state', exclusively by statesmen, the military or diplomats. The question is how to separate the 'national interest' from the interests of the elite, the private interests that surround them, regardless of the dialectics of social relationships, and the complexity of negotiations between public and private interests.

The answer to such a question, when one considers foreign policy as a public policy, lies in the analysis of interests, the construction of institutions, and politics. Ultimately, foreign policy must be brought into the realm of politics, thus recognising that its formulation and implementation fall into the dynamics of the choices of government, which all stem from coalitions, bargains, disputes and agreements between spokespersons for different interests, be they institutional or not. In short, foreign policy also expresses the dynamics of domestic politics. As a result, one needs to withdraw foreign policy from a condition associated with an inertial and self-evident 'national interest', which assumes that this policy should be protected from the cyclical nature of political parties and coalitions in power.

Clearly there are differences between foreign policy and other public policies that are primarily implemented 'at home'. Foreign policy also responds to systemic factors, regional constraints, global security demands, and world order changes. In the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy, the Brazilian state cannot ignore the relevance of the US on the American continent (what the US used to call the Western hemisphere); the erosion of its hegemony and the emergence of China; the dynamics of integration processes (Mercado Comum do Sul, or MERCOSUR, and Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, or UNASUR); globalisation flows (trade, technology, finance); new development partners (the BRICS group, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the IBSA group, consisting of India, Brazil and South Africa); the emergence of opposing alliances (the Pacific Alliance, including Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile); economic growth trends in Africa; and the strategic importance of the South Atlantic rim (and the India–Brazil–South Africa maritime), among other variables. However, it is important to note that when considering both the domestic and systemic dimensions, foreign policy does not arise only where domestic public policies end.

In recent years public policies in education, health and agriculture have also witnessed a continuous process of internationalisation. In parallel to the processes of economic globalisation, such internationalisation of public policies and the democratisation of the Brazilian political system have corroborated the globalisation of politics and resulted in new hierarchies between high and low politics in Brazilian foreign policy. The emblematic cases of new international offices of the Brazilian agriculture development agency – Embrapa (in Ghana), the public health foundation Fiocruz (in Mozambique), and the governmental think tank, the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (in Venezuela) – illustrate this argument.

However, internationalisation of public policies is not the same as export or imposition of public-policy practices. Based on the argument that there are *demands* for such practices coming from different countries (in Latin America, but also in Africa), the Brazilian government assumes that there is a high degree of acceptance and legitimacy associated with historical affinity and contextual development similarities. The process therefore is characterised within Brazilian policy circles as being demand-driven and, as such, holds greater claims to legitimacy at home and among its partners. Brazilian best practices are not imposed upon partners, although there is a need for researchers and civil-society organisations to monitor this phenomenon carefully so as to avoid a priori assumptions that do not always count upon empirical evidence and evaluation from the field. There is no doubt that South–South co-operation (SSC) experiences have been strongly impregnated by the rhetoric of commonalities and an announced ethic of solidarity among

developing countries. In the Brazilian case, institutionalisation of procedures for SSC is still in the early stages. Dialogue between Itamaraty and civil society is still a challenge for the future, and it will be necessary to return to these issues through new research projects to better understand hierarchies and asymmetries between the actors involved, and assess the existing relationships between such SSC projects and strategic interests, foreign trade and productive investment.

Brazil's SSC may include in its agenda a wide range of forms of co-operation among developing countries, from multilateral negotiation spaces (for example, the G-77 or G-20 trade), the formation of political coalitions (IBSA, BRICS), the promotion of South-South integration processes (MERCOSUR, UNASUR), making room for interregional dialogues (Africa-South America summits), and the financing of infrastructure projects through subsidised loans, to modalities of technology transfer, exchange of experiences in the field of public policies and technical co-operation through ministries, agencies, subnational entities, universities and NGOs. This shows that Brazilian SSC strategies have a clear *political dimension*, which provides a platform for co-operation among countries that want to strengthen their bilateral and multilateral coalitions in order to obtain bargaining power on the global agenda. IBSA co-operation and its development fund can be seen as an example of this,⁶ as well as the BRICS coalition. This policy decision may even result in domestic opposition and pressures that tend to denounce Brazil's neglect of its traditional Northern and Western partners. It also has an *economic dimension*, through the increase of trade between Brazil and other developing countries. According to data published by Itamaraty, between 1998 and 2008 countries from the North decreased their participation in Brazilian trade from 57.4% to 46.9%, while that of countries from the South (Latin America, Africa and Asia) increased from 42.4% to 53.1%.⁷ During the Lula administration, there was a substantial growth in economic relations (trade and the presence of Brazilian companies) between Brazil and Africa. Brazil and MERCOSUR signed economic agreements with a number of countries and African regional institutions. For example, agreements signed with South Africa included the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation in 2003; the Customs Cooperation Agreement (signed in 2008, ratified by South Africa, pending approval by the Brazilian Senate); and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade and the South African counterpart in 2009. A preferential trade agreement was signed with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2009; and a trade agreement was signed with Algeria in 2006. There are still negotiations between MERCOSUR and Egypt to sign a free trade agreement.

Brazilian business also benefits from this opening of markets on the African continent. Prominent companies are the Odebrecht group, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez and Queiroz Galvão. These companies operate in several countries, such as Mozambique, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Algeria and Libya. In the latter country, Brazilian companies held portfolios of more than \$6 billion in construction in 2010. Odebrecht has contracts of \$3.5 billion for constructing the new international airport and ring road in Tripoli. In the case of the extraction of natural resources, two companies (Vale and Petrobras) are responsible for the majority of Brazilian investments. Vale operates in various countries on the continent, such as Zambia, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola and South Africa. Its main projects, however, are in Mozambique, where Vale beat its international competition, winning the right to mine coal at Moatize,

which requires more than \$4.5 billion in investments, and Guinea, where Vale purchased 51% of BSG Resources Guinea for \$2.5 billion, which will entitle it to explore the rich deposits of iron. Petrobras also operates in different countries (Angola, Libya, Namibia, Tanzania, etc.), but has its main partner in Nigeria. The country is a major supplier of oil imported by Brazil. Moreover, with the Agbami and Akpo wells coming into operation, the Nigerian unit of Petrobras is one of its largest producers outside Brazil in the short and medium term.

In terms of practical results, increased trade between Brazil and African countries has been quite impressive, especially up to the global financial crisis in 2008. From 2002–2008, exports grew almost five-fold, eventually representing 5.14% of Brazil's total exports. In the same period, imports rose even more, to represent 9.11% of total imports. The majority of Brazilian exports are manufactured. According to an UNCTAD study entitled *South–South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership*,⁸ Brazil is Africa's 11th trade partner. Considering only the developing countries, Brazil was only behind China and India. Between 1995 and 2002, exports grew by about \$1 billion, an increase of 76%, compared with almost 400% in 2003–09 (see Table 1 for details).

Table 1: Evolution of Brazilian exports to Africa, 2002–10 (\$'000)

Year	Total exports	Basic products		Semi-manufactured goods		Manufactured goods	
		Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
2002	2,363,341	422,005	17.86	327,387	13.85	1,609,367	68.10
2003	2,862,004	531,802	18.58	406,993	14.22	1,917,441	67.00
2004	4,247,699	1,016,929	23.94	594,159	13.99	2,630,702	61.93
2005	5,981,354	1,292,479	21.61	894,876	14.96	3,789,311	63.35
2006	7,455,879	1,468,023	19.69	1,281,003	17.18	4,701,249	63.05
2007	8,578,222	1,583,446	18.46	1,077,622	12.56	5,906,614	68.86
2008	10,169,567	2,249,524	22.12	1,338,114	13.16	6,572,749	64.63
2009	8,692,380	2,197,235	25.28	1,472,011	16.93	5,012,153	57.66
2010	5,548,924	1,738,418	31.33	1,139,161	20.53	2,666,215	48.05

Source: Itamaraty, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010>, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010> (restricted access)

Finally, SSC has a *technical dimension*, through exchanges of knowledge and technological know-how. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), linked directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defines international technical co-operation as an important development tool, helping the beneficiary country to promote structural changes in its production systems as a way to overcome its natural and historical growth constraints. Programmes implemented under the ABC make it possible to transfer knowledge, successful experiences and equipment, but also to train human resources and strengthen host country institutions through capacity-building activities (seminars, scholarships, undergraduate and graduate

courses). The ABC attempts to follow the concept of technical co-operation among developing countries (TCDC), launched in Buenos Aires by the UN in 1978. In 2010 the IPEA and the ABC co-published the first report on Brazilian governmental institutional co-operation, focusing on co-operative actions of the federal government covering 2005–09. The report comprises an operational definition of international co-operation for development, including only resources invested by the Brazilian federal government under the form of donations, which are addressed to governments of other countries, their citizens (for instance, through scholarships), international organisations (multilateral system), and to groups or populations of other countries so as to improve their socio-economic conditions.⁹

Currently the ABC co-ordinates more than 300 projects and activities at different stages of implementation in 36 African countries, including Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Comoros, the DRC, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 2011 budget of technical co-operation with Africa exceeds BRL¹⁰ 65 million (about \$30 million) for all signed projects, representing about 55% of total resources committed by the ABC. One of the main goals of Brazilian foreign policy in Africa is to strengthen the relationship with the Portuguese-speaking countries. Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP) (including East Timor) countries have the largest number of projects and biggest budgets, compared with the African francophone and anglophone countries. However, there has been an effort to increase the co-operation agenda with other countries on the continent, including the implementation of large projects, such as vocational training centres and experimental farms. The largest number of demands for co-operation focuses on agriculture, health, education and training, but there are also projects in areas such as e-government, public administration, environment, information technology, entrepreneurship, co-operatives, urban development, sanitation, biofuels, aviation, tourism, and sports. Since Brazilian technical co-operation focuses on the training of human resources and strengthening of local institutions, it also aims at political stability and endogenous development. In 2003, ABC's budget was \$4.4 million, and it grew to 52.5 million in 2010.¹¹

By defining co-operation as an ensemble of projects concerning only grants, the Brazilian government has adopted a position that can be considered from at least two perspectives. First, Brazil's SSC programmes will be more horizontal, based on solidarity, and more co-operative, once they exclusively involve donations (through financing or technical co-operation). Brazil's government has distanced itself from the concept of official development assistance (ODA) by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), since it stresses that ODA can only be called co-operation activities for which the resources are not refundable. This statistical definition does not prevent ABC and the Brazilian government from signing trilateral co-operation programmes with USAID, the Japan International Cooperation Agency or the French Agency for Development, but it may be considered as a conceptual challenge for foreign aid and official development assistance definitions, which have been institutionalised by Western powers since the end of the Second World War. Second, when the Brazilian government defines its SSC based only on grant programmes and statistically only searches for initiatives that fall within donations, investments and loans are removed from the

total account of Brazil's international development co-operation efforts. This means that the 2010 report does not take into consideration the process of internationalisation of Brazilian companies, or the process of projection of Brazilian capitalism in South America or in African countries. Therefore, the Brazilian government protects itself, by restricting the scope of the official Brazilian co-operative efforts. This does not mean SSC is not of strategic importance in Brazil's foreign policy agenda, but there must still be an effort in terms of transparency and accounting projects implemented by the National Social and Economic Development Bank, as well as programmes implemented by subnational entities (federated states and municipalities).¹²

Arguably, although the boundaries between technical co-operation, subsidised loans, and markets for companies are not clear, there is no doubt that the government of Brazil acknowledges the strategic importance of SSC in foreign policy agendas. Brazil rejects the OECD–Development Assistance Committee's terminology of 'donor', 'aid' and 'assistance'. It shares the SSC definition given by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), namely the process, the institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical co-operation among developing countries that are seeking common development in a horizontal relationship.¹³ SSC is presented as an alternative to North–South co-operation. Brazil experienced advances in SSC in the 1990s, when technical co-operation was used as a diplomatic tool. Fernando Henrique Cardoso made some efforts to intensify technical co-operation with South American and Portuguese-speaking countries, but it was mainly after 2003 that SSC acquired priority status in foreign policy agendas. During 2005–09 the rubrics concerning humanitarian aid, scholarships for foreigners, contributions to international organisations and technical co-operation achieved amounted to approximately \$1.4 billion, as Table 2 details below.

Table 2: Brazilian international development co-operation, 2005–09

Types	Total 2005–09 (\$)	Relative part (%)
Humanitarian co-operation	79,107,405.83	5.55
Scholarships for foreigners	138,748,539.84	9.73
Technical co-operation	125,694,247.66	8.81
Contribution to intergovernmental organisations	1,082,700,249.40	75.91
Total	1,426,250,442.73	100.00

Source: IPEA & ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005–2009* [Brazilian International Development Co-operation]. Brasília: IPEA & ABC, 2010, p. 20

Brazil's SSC strategies show at least two notable aspects. First, Africa is prominent in Brazil's SSC agenda. In his eight years in office, President Lula da Silva visited 29 countries (some more than once), totalling more visits to the continent than the combined visits of all previous presidents. The number of trips made by the minister of foreign affairs was also significant. Moreover, Brazil not only reversed the policy of closing embassies in African countries, but reopened embassies in various countries. Although these measures have a strong political character, they can also strengthen economic (and trade) ties, both

in the short and long term. In many of his travels, Lula was accompanied by a delegation of businessmen. Several business organisations were established as a direct result of these visits, as in the case of the official launch of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil–Ghana in 2005.

Under President Dilma Rousseff, there has been a change in style and intensity regarding SSC and the African continent. Between January 2011 and December 2013 Rousseff undertook 49 official missions: 22 in Latin America, 11 in Europe, four in the US (three in the UN and one in Washington), seven in Africa (two in South Africa), one in China, one in India, one in Turkey, and two in Russia.¹⁴ Following the Lula government's transition to Rousseff, Brazil's foreign policy continued to give greater importance to CSS strategies, particularly in the field of BRICS and IBSA coalitions. Clearly there was a change in the driving style of diplomatic and political conflict management: Rousseff does not share the same international charisma of Lula, although his approval ratings in public opinion polls in Brazil, had, until June 2013, supported the high popularity of the first woman president of Brazil. Rousseff was considered Lula's political creation. Until popular demonstrations in June 2013 against excessive World Cup budget expenses, corruption, lack of decent education and public health policies, Rousseff was able to coast on Lula's popularity. However, 2014 is an electoral year, and political disputes (including within the current governing coalition) stand in Rousseff's way to remain in power. Similarly, the replacement of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim by Antonio Patriota, who himself was replaced in 2013 by Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, also engendered a lack of continuity and differences in emphasis and political style, which was expected, although the topic of CSS has remained a priority on the agenda of Brazilian foreign policy.

Second, it should also be noted that there was a significant growth in the ABC's budget between 2003 and 2010, with some reduction since 2011. This growth has been accompanied by Itamaraty losing its monopoly over promoting international co-operation. It is now difficult to find a ministry or governmental agency that does not have its own budget devoted to international affairs. More than this, under the Brazilian model of federalism, SSC can also take the form of decentralised co-operation, with growing international actions undertaken by federated states and municipalities. The Decentralised Programme for South–South Technical Cooperation, launched in 2012 by the presidency, illustrates the diversification of agendas and actors in the field of Brazilian foreign policy.

As indicated above, during Lula's government, the Brazilian SSC agendas increased quantitatively and qualitatively, especially in the case of Mozambique (Fiocruz project in the field of public health), Cape Verde (higher education), Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin (Embrapa's Cotton+4 project on agricultural development), among others. Such a change is perceived both in speeches, institutional documents, and presidential missions. Presidential diplomacy is part of the Brazilian policy of building a regional leadership. For example, in July 2009 Lula was guest of honour at the 13th Summit of the African Union held in Libya. Brazil's Africanist foreign policy is not new, it is true; however, since 2003 there has been a significant revival of such agendas involving co-operation, access to markets and investment. According to the report published by the World Bank and IPEA in 2011, in 2009, the Brazilian government forgave the debts of Angola and Mozambique, and donated \$300 million in food co-operation to Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Western Sahara and members of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP). Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean received 62% of total federal

resources allocated to technical co-operation, science and technology from 2005–09, according to the IPEA. From 2005–09 Brazil also contributed about \$10 million to the African Development Fund, bringing Brazil's total financial contribution to the bank since 1973 – when Brazil began to make such contributions – to \$210 million in 2009.¹⁵

CONCLUSION

Since 2003 Brazil's foreign policy has shifted from a need for credibility (adherence to international regimes, respect for norms, greater proximity to the West) towards a search for political autonomy based on regionalism (MERCOSUR, UNASUR), SSC (Africa, the CPLP, Latin America), and new coalitions (IBSA, BRICS). With crises in capitalism and changes in the world political order, Brazil has reiterated its commitment to multilateralism (the UN, World Trade Organization), not in the sense of either confrontation or submission, but in seeking to benefit from changing hegemonic structures of capitalism, and also to be part of the international game. As Lula affirmed during the visit of the president of Zambia, Rupiah Banda, to Brazil:¹⁶

In the 1960s we were fighting against the remnants of colonialism. Today, it is the lack of legitimacy of global governance mechanisms that is obvious. We must persist in our commitment to reform decision-making mechanisms in all areas. In an interdependent world, we need institutions that are more democratic and that offer more equitable solutions. We must speak with one voice in the construction of a world order to hear our aspirations for freedom and social justice.

This defence of a greater co-operation among the countries of the South and regional integration can be understood as important diplomatic strategies towards the emergence of Brazil as a global power.

However, in terms of SSC in the field of development, it seems more than necessary that the government should increase and build institutions for policy dialogues involving governmental representatives, business directors, social movements, and NGO leaderships. Building institutions is a *sine qua non* condition for transparency, accountability in terms of results, and a sensitised public opinion. It should also insist on transparent monitoring and evaluation by Brazilian research centres, NGOs, and partners from African and Latin American countries involved in various projects. Taking into consideration the role of Odebrecht in Angola and Vale in Mozambique,¹⁷ it would be important to encourage Brazilian businesses to develop a code of ethics in their partnerships with African and Latin American countries, also as a means for negotiating projects with leaders in developing countries that are Brazil's partners. Finally, as far as the academic world is concerned, it is necessary to steer research, including groups and centres from Brazil, Latin America and African countries, as a means for mutual knowledge production, and definition of common criteria of development effectiveness. This is particularly true in the case of Brazil and South Africa.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In 2009 the anthropologist, Cristina Patriota de Moura, conducted a detailed survey of some of the aspects related to social capital and symbolic capital, and the organisational culture of the networks of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. In her book, she notes, for example, that tradition and renewal are values dear to the ministry, which also shows growing concern about the representativeness of the diplomatic corps in relation to the diversity of the Brazilian population. Indeed, Itamaraty falls within the major criteria of a professional bureaucracy: promotion based on meritocracy, universal selection procedures and entry exams, expertise and capacity-building programmes. More recently, under Lula's government, positive discrimination programmes were set up, such as a scholarship of around \$1,200 per month for a period of one year for selected Afro-Brazilians to study and prepare themselves for the entry exam (known as Itamaraty's politics of recognition). De Moura CP, *O Instituto Rio Branco e a diplomacia brasileira* [Rio Branco Institute and Brazilian diplomacy]. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2009.
- 2 Cervo AL, 'Political regimes and Brazil's foreign policy', in Sombra Saraiva JF (ed.), *Foreign Policy and Political Regime*. Brasilia: IBRI, 2003.
- 3 Sombra Saraiva JF, 'Regime político e política exterior: novas aproximações' [Political regime and foreign policy], *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Brasília, 46, 1, 2003, pp. 208–11; Cervo AL, 'Political regimes and Brazil's foreign policy', in Sombra Saraiva JF (ed.), *Foreign Policy and Political Regime*. Brasilia: IBRI, 2003; Soares de Lima MR, 'Instituições democráticas e política exterior' [Democratic institutions and foreign policy], *Contexto Internacional*, 22, 2, 2000; Pinheiro L & CRS Milani, *Política Externa Brasileira: As Práticas da Política e a Política da Práticas* [Brazilian Foreign Policy: Practices of the Policy, Politics of the Practices]. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2012.
- 4 Beard C, *The Idea of National Interest*. New York: Macmillan, 1934.
- 5 Renouvin P & J Duroselle, *Introduction à l'Histoire des Relations Internationales* [Introduction to the History of International Relations]. Paris: Armand Collin, 1995.
- 6 Under the initiative of the IBSA Fund, India, Brazil and South Africa have already completed projects in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Palestine; and currently run projects in Burundi, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Sierra Leone and Vietnam. Created in 2004, the fund's objective, based on the available capacities of the IBSA countries and their national experiences, is to consider the most successful, self-sustaining and replicable support projects, targeting particularly the needs of less-developed countries and MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). As recognition of the success of its initiatives, in 2006 the IBSA Fund received the 'South-South Association for South-South Alliance' prize, awarded by the UN Development Programme; and in 2010 it received the 'Millennium Development Goals Awards', granted by the Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee NGO focused on promoting the Millennium Development Goals.
- 7 Data presented here is from the recently published evaluation of Brazilian foreign policy by Itamaraty, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010>.
- 8 UNCTAD, 'Economic development in Africa: South-South cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership', Fifty-seventh session, Geneva, 15–28 September 2010.
- 9 IPEA & ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2005–2009* [Brazilian International Development Co-operation]. Brasília: IPEA & ABC, 2010.
- 10 Three-letter code for the Brazilian Real.

- 11 Itamaraty, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010> (restricted access).
- 12 For a broad view on this topic, please check Milani CRS & MCM Ribeiro, 'International relations and the paradiplomacy of Brazilian cities: Crafting the concept of Local international management', *Brazilian Administration Review*, 8, pp. 21–36, 2011, <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/bar/v8n1/v8n1a03.pdf>.
- 13 *Ibid.*; UNCTAD, *op. cit.*
- 14 This information is according to data published by the presidency, Brazil, <http://www2.planalto.gov.br> (non-English website).
- 15 Itamaraty, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010> (restricted access).
- 16 MRE (Ministério das Relações Exteriores) [Ministry of External Relations], Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante reunião de instalação da Secretaria da Cúpula América do Sul-África [Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during a meeting of the Secretariat of the South America-Africa Summit]. Caracas, August 2010.
- 17 See in this connection the detailed field report prepared by PACS (Instituto de Políticas Alternativas para o Conso Sul), 'A História contada pela caça ou pelo caçador? Perspectivas sobre o Brasil em Angola e Moçambique' [History told by the hunted or the hunter? Perspectives on Brazil in Angola and Mozambique], by Ana Saggiore Garcia, Karina Lato and Camila Fontes, <http://www.pacs.org.br/files/2013/03/Relatorio-Africa.pdf>.

SAIIA'S FUNDING PROFILE

SAIIA raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. Our work is currently being funded by, among others, the Bradlow Foundation, the UK's Department for International Development, the European Commission, the British High Commission of South Africa, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, INWENT, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa. SAIIA's corporate membership is drawn from the South African private sector and international businesses with an interest in Africa. In addition, SAIIA has a substantial number of international diplomatic and mainly South African institutional members.

South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House, East Campus, University of the Witwatersrand
PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, South Africa
Tel +27 (0)11 339-2021 • Fax +27 (0)11 339-2154
www.saiia.org.za • info@saiia.org.za

